What is cumulative cultural evolution? by Mesoudi, AA & Thornton, A
 on June 13, 2018http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgReview
Cite this article: Mesoudi A, Thornton A.
2018 What is cumulative cultural evolution?
Proc. R. Soc. B 285: 20180712.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0712Received: 29 March 2018
Accepted: 23 May 2018Subject Category:
Behaviour
Subject Areas:
behaviour, evolution
Keywords:
animal culture, cultural evolution, cumulative
culture, innovation, social learningAuthor for correspondence:
Alex Mesoudi
e-mail: a.mesoudi@exeter.ac.ukElectronic supplementary material is available
online at https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.c.4116527
& 2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.What is cumulative cultural evolution?
Alex Mesoudi and Alex Thornton
Human Behaviour and Cultural Evolution Group, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter,
Exeter, UK
AM, 0000-0002-7740-1625
In recent years, the phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has
become the focus of major research interest in biology, psychology and
anthropology. Some researchers argue that CCE is unique to humans and
underlies our extraordinary evolutionary success as a species. Others
claim to have found CCE in non-human species. Yet others remain sceptical
that CCE is even important for explaining human behavioural diversity and
complexity. These debates are hampered by multiple and often ambiguous
definitions of CCE. Here, we review how researchers define, use and test
CCE. We identify a core set of criteria for CCE which are both necessary
and sufficient, and may be found in non-human species. We also identify
a set of extended criteria that are observed in human CCE but not, to
date, in other species. Different socio-cognitive mechanisms may underlie
these different criteria. We reinterpret previous theoretical models and
observational and experimental studies of both human and non-human
species in light of these more fine-grained criteria. Finally, we discuss key
issues surrounding information, fitness and cognition. We recommend that
researchers are more explicit about what components of CCE they are testing
and claiming to demonstrate.1. Introduction
Anthropologists, biologists and psychologists have long been engaged in a
search to discover the traits that make us uniquely human. Why have we,
alone in the animal kingdom, created art and literature, socio-political systems
that permit large-scale cooperation, and the scientific and technological knowl-
edge to colonize the whole planet and explore space? Over the years, many
candidates, including tool-making, episodic memory and semantic communi-
cation, have fallen by the wayside as researchers have uncovered hitherto
unknown abilities in other animals [1].
Today, a leading front-runner for the key to human success is cumulative
culture, or cumulative cultural evolution (CCE). This concept was brought to
prominence in the 1990s by Boyd & Richerson [2] and Tomasello [3] to contrast
human culture with the culture of non-human species. Even then there was evi-
dence for both social learning and cultural traditions in non-human species,
and this evidence has amassed in the years since. Many species across multiple
taxa learn from one another, and in such a way that can generate behavioural
differences between groups of individuals [4–9]. However, Tomasello argued
that only humans could ‘accumulate modifications over time’ wheresome individual or group of individuals first invented a primitive version of [an] arti-
fact or practice, and then some later user or users made a modification, an
‘improvement,’ that others then adopted perhaps without change for many gener-
ations, at which point some other individual or group of individuals made another
modification, which was then learned and used by others, and so on over historical
time in what has sometimes been dubbed ‘the ratchet effect’ [3, p. 5].A ratchet is a device with angled teeth that allows a bar or cog to move in one
direction only. Here, it is a metaphor for the accumulation of increasingly effec-
tive modifications without reverting back to prior, less effective states. Boyd &
Richerson highlight the consequences of CCE:
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cultures do accumulate changes over many generations, result-
ing in culturally transmitted behaviors that no single human
individual could invent on their own. Even in the simplest hunt-
ing and gathering societies people depend on such complex,
evolved knowledge and technology. To live in the arid Kala-
hari, the !Kung San need to know what plants are edible,
how to find them during different seasons, how to find
water, how to track and find game, how to make bows and
arrow poison, and many other skills. The fact that the !Kung
can acquire the knowledge, tools, and skills necessary to survive
the rigors of the Kalahari is not so surprising—many other species
can do the same. What is amazing is that the same brain that
allows the !Kung to survive in the Kalahari, also permits the
Inuit to acquire the very different knowledge, tools, and skills
necessary to live on the tundra and ice north of the Arctic
circle, and the Ache the knowledge, tools, and skills necessary
to live in the tropical forests of Paraguay. There is no other
animal that occupies a comparable range of habitats or utilizes
a comparable range of subsistence techniques and social
structures. [2, p. 80] 20180712The italicized phrase in this quotation highlights a commonly
cited consequence or criterion for CCE that its products
exceed what a single individual could invent alone. The
rest of the quotation represents a typical argument for the
adaptiveness of CCE.
Over 20 years later, CCE remains a frequently cited rubi-
con between human and non-human cognition and culture
[10–13], but has not gone unchallenged. There have been
claims of CCE in chimpanzees [14], baboons [15], macaques
[16], New Caledonian crows [17], pigeons [18] and in the
songs of some birds [19] and cetaceans [20]. In some cases
[e.g. 18], almost identical experimental designs are used to
demonstrate CCE in a non-human species as those used to
demonstrate CCE in humans [21].
Leaving non-human species aside, there is also debate
within the human evolutionary sciences over the impor-
tance, or even existence, of CCE. Proponents of ‘cultural
attraction’ (e.g. [22]) have argued that CCE is less important
for explaining human cultural diversity and change than
claimed by other cultural evolution researchers (e.g. [23])
and focus more on intuitively attractive cultural traditions
that do not exceed what one individual could invent or recon-
struct alone. Some evolutionary psychologists, meanwhile,
deny any meaningful role for culture in generating human
behavioural diversity, instead focusing on how behaviour
is generated by genetic programmes that evoke different
behaviour in different environments [24,25]. According to
this view, complex behaviour arises from cumulative genetic
evolution plus sophisticated genetically evolved individual
cognition [26], not CCE.
These twin debates—one over whether CCE is found in
non-human species and the other over the importance of
CCE in explaining human ecological success—are hampered
by the multiple ways in which CCE is used and defined.
Some of these definitions are listed in electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S1. While there are many commonalities,
there is also much variation. Often, these different senses of
CCE are not made explicit, leading to confusion or see-
mingly contradictory claims.
Our aim is to review how researchers typically use, test
and define CCE to resolve, or at least highlight, this ambiguity.
We first suggest a set of core criteria that are necessary for
a population to exhibit CCE. We then specify a set of
extended criteria which may or may not be present. We rein-
terpret previous theoretical models and empirical findings inlight of these criteria, suggest that different cognitive mechan-
isms may underlie different forms of CCE and highlight
problematic concepts. We recommend that researchers are
clearer about which criteria they are studying and avoid treat-
ing CCE as a unitary rubicon separating human and non-
human species.2. Core criteria
Our core criteria follow the definition of CCE provided in
Tomasello’s quotation above. We suggest that the minimum
requirements for a population to exhibit CCE are (i) a
change in behaviour (or product of behaviour, such as an
artefact), typically due to asocial learning, followed by (ii)
the transfer via social learning of that novel or modified
behaviour to other individuals or groups, where (iii) the
learned behaviour causes an improvement in performance,
which is a proxy of genetic and/or cultural fitness, with
(iv) the previous three steps repeated in a manner that
generates sequential improvement over time.
The first criterion provides a source of behavioural vari-
ation in the form of either the emergence of entirely new
behaviour or modification of existing behaviour. This could
occur via asocial learning (e.g. associative learning or
higher-level problem-solving or creativity) or collective learning,
where behavioural novelty arises from the interactions
between individuals in groups [27,28]. Variation may also
be introduced by random copying error or other stochastic
processes. Without the introduction of behavioural variation,
there can be no change over time, only stasis, which would
clearly not constitute CCE.
The second criterion specifies that the behavioural
variant must be passed to others via social learning. If this
did not occur, then the innovation would be lost when
the innovating individual died or the innovating group
disbanded. This again would not count as CCE (nor as
culture more generally, thus justifying the word ‘cultural’ in
the term CCE).
The third criterion specifies that the learned behavioural
variant must enhance some measure of performance, which
is a proxy for inclusive genetic and/or cultural fitness. This
is implied in Tomasello’s use of the term ‘improvement’ and
Boyd & Richerson’s description linking CCE to ecological
adaptation. Several definitions in electronic supplementary
material, table S1 also mention ‘improvement’, although
this is seldom itself explicitly defined. By ‘performance’,
we mean the characteristics of the socially learned trait
that are maximized or desired according to the neurobiolo-
gical, cognitive, emotional and other evaluative mechanisms
of individuals. Examples of performance measures might
include the efficiency of migratory routes or extractive fora-
ging, the durability and sharpness of cutting tools, or the
aesthetic attractiveness of art or dress styles. In some cases
of CCE, especially in non-human species, this increase in
performance will increase genetic fitness in terms of direct or
indirect reproductive success (i.e. inclusive fitness). In other
cases, especially in post-demographic transition human
societies, it is harder to see genetic fitness benefits of CCE.
Here, we may speak instead of ‘cultural fitness’ where CCE
may not maximize—and may even be detrimental to—genetic
fitness [29,30]. The notion of fitness/improvement is complex
and is revisited below.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
285:20180712
3
 on June 13, 2018http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from The final criterion states that innovation and social
learning must be repeated over time to generate sequential
improvement in performance. Although admittedly ambiguous,
the terms ‘repeated’ and ‘sequential’ are intended to rule
out cases where a single behavioural variant spreads
within a population, perhaps to fixation, with no further
modification or improvement. For instance, meerkat pups
learn from adults to eat hard-boiled eggs, a novel experimen-
tally introduced food source, but there is no further
modification to this tradition [31]. As Tomasello notes,
there may be a period of stasis before further modification
or improvement, which can only be detected with long-
term historical data. This final core criterion justifies the
word ‘cumulative’ in the term CCE.
We can contrast our core CCE criteria with the following
cases of non-CCE which do not fulfil the criteria: (a) asocial or
collective learning with no social learning beyond the
immediate individual or group, which would produce
improvement in performance that is lost when individuals
die or groups disband, (b) improvement via genetic adap-
tation by natural selection, where the increase in fitness is
via beneficial genetic mutations and the transmission is gen-
etic and (c) cultural evolution that is non-cumulative, where
fitness-neutral learned behaviours are transmitted via social
learning. The latter may include changes in traits such as
first names in humans [32], or changes in birdsong [33],
both of which fit theoretical expectations of neutral drift.
Finally, note that our core criteria justify the word ‘evol-
ution’ in the term CCE, by providing a system of descent
with modification that bears parallels with genetic evolution
[34]. Criterion (i) provides variation, criteria (ii) and (iv) pro-
vide an inheritance system, while criterion (iii) provides a
means of adaptation to local environments, sometimes
called ‘cultural adaptation’ [35]. This is not to imply that
CCE is identical to cumulative genetic evolution [36]: for
example, the generation of fitness-enhancing innovations by
asocial learning may be very different to blind genetic
mutation.3. Extended criteria
While all definitions of CCE in the literature listed in elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S1 explicitly or
implicitly include our core criteria, some include additional
criteria that we view as extensions of the core criteria.
(a) Multiple functionally dependent cultural traits
Our core criteria could apply to a single behavioural trait that
is refined over time to generate repeated improvement in the
same performance measure. For example, a navigation route
towards the same fixed point might be increasingly refined to
become more efficient over time [18]. An extension of this
would be where multiple socially learned behavioural traits
are chained together to generate repeated improvement in
the same performance measure, with each step functionally
or sequentially dependent on the previous steps [37]. As an
example of functional dependence, Enquist et al. [38] suggest
the Four Colour Conjecture in mathematics, for which there
were a series of successive partial solutions each building
and improving on the previous one. This functional depen-
dence of multiple cultural traits is mentioned in some
definitions in electronic supplementary material, table S1(e.g. ‘To make the process of cultural accumulation realistic,
we specified that innovations were contingent upon earlier
discoveries’ [39] or ‘Dependencies refer to relationships
between elements, such that the presence of one cultural
element affects the likelihood that another element appears
or disappears’ [38]).
(b) Diversification into multiple lineages
Our core criteria focus on a single lineage of an increasingly
refined behavioural trait. Our first extended criterion, func-
tional dependence, can also occur with a single lineage of
linked traits. A further extension would be diversification,
with parallel lineages arising when one lineage branches
into multiple lineages. These lineages may, at least initially,
be alternative means of maximizing the same performance
measure, such as the bow-and-arrow and the spear-thrower
as alternative means of projectile hunting [40]. Diversification
is mentioned in some definitions in electronic supplementary
material, table S1 (e.g. ‘[An] important characteristic of cumu-
lative technological evolution [is] diversification of tool
design’ [17] or ‘[a] fundamental propert[y] of human cumu-
lative culture [is] lineage specificity, with different kinds of
structure emerging in different chains’) [15]. Diversification
may occur within individuals (a single individual has knowl-
edge of both bows and spear-throwers), between individuals
within the same group (some individuals use bows, others
spear-throwers) or between semi-isolated groups within a
larger population, paralleling mechanisms of speciation in
genetic evolution (e.g. sympatric and allopatric speciation).
(c) Recombination across lineages
Once there are multiple cultural lineages, we may see recom-
bination of traits across those lineages. Some definitions of
CCE in electronic supplementary material, table S1 refer to
this recombination (e.g. ‘The paradigmatic case of ratcheting
is when an individual adds an existing technique used in a
different context . . . to an existing technique, and integrates
them functionally’ [41]).
In human CCE, recombination can be explicitly measured
in the patent record, where patent filers must cite any pre-
vious patents (prior art) upon which their patent is based.
Youn et al. [42] found that the proportion of all patents that
constitute recombination, defined as the combination of two
or more existing patents, has increased since 1870, becoming
much more common than non-recombination inventions,
which represent entirely new technology classes or cite only
a single previous patent.
(d) Cultural exaptation
The previous three extended criteria could occur with the
same performance measure or function. The bow-and-
arrow and spear-thrower, for example, are divergent lineages
of functionally dependent traits that both fulfil the function of
launching projectiles. In other cases, the previous three cri-
teria could result in a change of function: a trait that
originally culturally evolved to maximize one performance
measure may be used to fulfil another. This resembles exap-
tation in genetic evolution [43], and we label this cultural
exaptation. There are numerous examples from human CCE
of technologies originally designed for one function even-
tually becoming more widely used to fulfil another [44,45],
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[46], or the use in ship rudders of iron hinges originally used
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We have so far assumed that performance measures and fit-
ness proxies are independent of the CCE process and its
products, with CCE resulting in increasing cultural fitness
(e.g. sharper blades). While cultural exaptation involves a
change in function, it is also possible that CCE can itself
modify and create fitness proxies. This would open up
entirely new design spaces that cannot be reached without
prior CCE. This can be seen as a form of cultural niche con-
struction [48], where CCE modifies and creates its own
selection pressures. For example, the invention of auto-
mobiles in the early twentieth century opened up a new
design space for rubber tyres, which tyre manufacturers
rapidly explored [49].124. Models of cumulative cultural evolution
Electronic supplementary material, table S2 lists models that
have attempted to capture the dynamics of CCE. The most
influential model, Henrich’s [50] ‘Tasmanian’ model, features
all of our core criteria and none of our extended criteria.
There is a single fitness proxy, z, and a single behavioural
trait that can be increasingly refined to reach higher values
of z. Each individual of each new generation attempts to
copy the trait of the individual in the previous generation
with the highest z. Improvement occurs via ‘lucky guesses
or errors’: occasionally an individual generates a behaviour
with a higher z than the best demonstrator. Henrich used
this model to highlight the limits that population size
places on CCE, as populations that are too small cannot sus-
tain complex cultural traits given copying errors. Regarding
our extended criteria, there is only a single trait, a single line-
age and a single fitness proxy, and so no functional
dependence, diversification, recombination, exaptation or
niche construction.
Subsequent models have added our extended criteria.
Functional dependence is modelled as a sequence of discrete
traits that must be acquired in order [41,51–54]. One resulting
insight is that the cost of social and individual learning may
increase as CCE proceeds, simply because there is more to
learn, thus potentially slowing down CCE [51,52]. Some
models allow diversification in multiple lineages and recom-
bination across those lineages [38,53–55], often finding that
recombination generates exponential increases in the
number of cultural traits just like real-life human CCE
[38,53]. The most sophisticated models are those of Kolodny
and co-workers [53,56], which assume incrementally chan-
ging and recombining lineages branching off a main trait
axis. However, no models have properly explored the possi-
bility of multiple fitness proxies, nor the cultural exaptation
and niche construction which may follow. Cultural fitness
is often not explicitly modelled, beyond the assumption
that traits increase in number over time; in order to model
our final two extended criteria, we would need to assume
multiple, changing fitness proxies that individual traits may
fulfil.5. Cumulative cultural evolution in non-human
species
Electronic supplementary material, table S3 summarizes
studies that have examined CCE (or precursors to CCE) in
non-human species. Some field studies have claimed, on
the basis of circumstantial evidence, that certain primates
and corvids exhibit CCE [16,17,57], but there are few exper-
imental studies capable of testing whether non-human
animals meet our criteria. Some experiments suggest that
chimpanzees may, under certain circumstances, switch
from a relatively inefficient to a more efficient foraging or
tool-use technique after observing others [14,58–60], con-
sistent with our core criteria (i)– (iii), but do not examine
the scope for repeated improvements (core criterion (iv)).
Indeed, in a study using a three-stage sequential problem-
solving task, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys failed to
build on learned behaviour to reach higher stages with
more desirable food rewards [37]. Another study found
that the performance of Guinea baboons on a spatial
memory task improved across transmission chains when
the pattern of stimuli seen by each baboon was derived
from a previous individual’s choices [15]. However, this
experiment provided no direct opportunity for social learning
(criterion (ii)).
Although research into non-human CCE has focused
heavily on primates, the only two studies to provide evidence
for all four core criteria involved birds [18,19] (see electronic
supplementary material, table S2 for details). In Sasaki &
Biro’s study of homing pigeons [18], experimental conditions
began with a single individual who learned a homing route
over 12 trials. This individual then flew the route 12 times
with a naive bird. Subsequently, across five ‘generations’,
the most experienced bird of a pair was replaced with a
naive individual. Replacement chains ended with shorter
routes than control chains (lone birds or pairs flying the
same route repeatedly), demonstrating all our core criteria:
(i) behavioural change via individual or collective learning,
(ii) social learning and (iii) improvements in route efficiency
which (iv) were repeated over successive pair combinations.
In all experimental studies of non-human CCE, improve-
ment can only occur in a single trait up to a single, fixed
optimum. This contrasts with the open-endedness of much
human CCE, which likely relies on some or all of our
extended criteria. Nevertheless, research suggests that at
least some non-human animals may exhibit simple forms of
CCE, and raises the possibility that some facets of animal be-
haviour, from migration routes to tool use and the
construction of elaborate structures, may stem, at least
partly, from an incremental cultural history.
6. Human experiments
Electronic supplementary material, table S4 summarizes
experimental studies of CCE in humans. These use a variety
of tasks, including material (e.g. spaghetti towers), virtual
(e.g. virtual fishing nets) and social (e.g. languages) artefacts,
and different designs, including linear transmission chains
and groups with or without replacement of members [61].
Most experiments in adults and children meet all our core cri-
teria (electronic supplementary material, table S4).
Demonstrations of our extended criteria are less common,
but all have been observed at least once.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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experiments where the invention of new tools is contingent
on the presence of other tools. Derex & Boyd [62] provided
participants with initial resources like stones that could be
combined in sequence with other resources to produce com-
pound tools like axes. McGuigan et al. [63] demonstrated
similar functional dependence in children with a physical
artefact, where longer stick tools were fashioned from shorter
ones to extract rewards from a puzzle box.
Diversification is observed in studies using transmission
chains. Caldwell & Millen [21] found that spaghetti tower
and paper airplane designs gradually became more similar
within chains than between chains. However, their analyses
also suggest that chains became more similar across time,
probably because inherently more successful designs were
universally favoured. Evidence for long-term diversification
comes from a study that implemented separate design trajec-
tories each of which led to different optima [39]. Overall,
electronic supplementary material, table S4 suggests that
diversification is often possible in experiments but rarely
formally analysed.
Recombination, cultural exaptation and cultural niche
construction are seldom investigated experimentally, prob-
ably due to the difficulty of designing tasks that feature
these more open-ended criteria. In the aforementioned
study implementing multiple optima [39], recombination
across lineages allowed novel combinations to be created. In
another [62], participants could create tools with different
functions (e.g. axes for cutting or pigments for decorating),
which could be used across functional categories (e.g. axes
could be used to crush berries to make paint) demonstrating
cultural exaptation, and some functions could only be
reached after certain traits had been accumulated, demon-
strating cultural niche construction. Beyond these rare
‘proof-of-concept’ studies, the full scope and consequences
of these extended criteria have yet to be fully explored in
the laboratory.7. Key questions
(a) What distinguishes core and extended criteria?
Our review of the non-human literature suggests that while
some species meet our core criteria, none show evidence of
the extended criteria. While it is often claimed that CCE
underpins human ecological success, perhaps one or all of
the extended criteria are actually responsible for this. If so, it
is instructive to ask what distinguishes the extended criteria
from the core.
One possibility is that our core criteria involve the
reduction of uncertainty and increase in learnability, while
the extended criteria involve an increase in uncertainty and
reduction in learnability. In Sasaki & Biro’s [18] pigeon
study, for example, which involves only our core criteria,
initial uncertainty about the optimal route is reduced by
repeated individual and social learning until chains reach
the single most-efficient route. Once the optimum is reached,
no uncertainty remains. Given that learning is a means of
reducing uncertainty about the world, we can conversely
view this in terms of ‘learnability’: there is either no change
in the difficulty of learning successive routes, or perhaps an
increase in learnability if beeline routes are easier to learn
than more convoluted routes.Our extended criteria, however, typically involve an
increase in uncertainty and an attendant decrease in learn-
ability. Functional dependence makes compound traits
increasingly harder to learn, as prior steps (e.g. arithmetic)
must be mastered before later steps (e.g. calculus) can be
acquired [51]. Diversification and recombination result in an
exponential increase in design space, vastly increasing the
range of possible behavioural options available to learners.
Cultural niche construction creates new fitness proxies,
each of which represent entirely new design spaces. Our
extended criteria, then, generate the ‘open-endedness’ that
is characteristic of human CCE.
This distinction between uncertainty-reducing and
uncertainty-increasing processes can be viewed in terms of
information in the Shannon–Weaver entropy sense, where
information is a measure of the number of states that a
system can take. However, many have argued that
information in this sense misses key features of biological
systems [64,65]. A valuable future task would be to
integrate CCE into explicitly evolutionary theories of
information, such as those based on statistical decision
theory [64].
In principle, ‘learnability’ can be operationalized by
measuring the probability that a naive individual invents or
discovers a trait on their own, or the time it takes to learn a
trait. Our core criteria involve an increase or no change in
this ‘learnability’ measure, while our extended criteria
involve a decrease. This resembles Tennie et al.’s [11] notion
of ‘zone of latent solutions’ (ZLS), which encompasses beha-
viours that individuals ‘could easily invent on their own’
(p. 2 406). They argue, similarly to us, that only human cul-
ture exceeds this ZLS. However, we would see this as an
outcome of our extended criteria rather than a criterion
itself. We would also see learnability as a continuous measure
rather than a discrete ‘zone’. A problem with both ‘learnability’
and the ZLS is that it is impractical to test learning in truly
‘naive’ individuals, especially humans. It is impossible to
create a Robinson Crusoe-style experiment to test what a
single individual can or cannot invent alone. Asocial con-
ditions in experiments can be used, but people come into
experiments already possessing huge amounts of cultu-
rally acquired knowledge. Moreover, experiments last a
few hours at most, rather than an entire lifetime. Nevertheless,
further development of this learnability criterion is
recommended.
This distinction also links to debates over language evol-
ution and cultural attraction. In experimental studies of
language evolution [66], artificial languages become more
easily learned via repeated transmission, to a point where
they are maximally learnable and expressive. This also
applies to cases of iterated learning where there is a single
intuitive prior upon which chains converge [67]. Cultural
attraction theorists, similarly, focus on cases where cultural
representations converge on intuitive, easily learnable and
reconstructible forms [22]. These would all be cases of our
core criteria, entailing a reduction in uncertainty and increase
in learnability. Cases of technological or scientific CCE,
however, seem to entail our extended criteria given their
open-endedness and decrease in learnability. Disagreement
over the importance of CCE in human culture may arise
due to confusion between what we are calling core and
extended criteria: some cases of human CCE involve core cri-
teria, others extended.
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Virtually, all definitions of CCE specify ‘improvement’ as a
requirement of CCE, hence its inclusion in our core criteria.
We suggested above that this involves an improvement in
some measure of performance, which is a proxy of genetic
and/or cultural fitness. Yet, the notion of fitness is under-
theorized in the context of CCE. A core assumption of
behavioural ecology is that behaviour evolves to maximize
inclusive (direct and indirect genetic) fitness. In practice, fit-
ness is typically assessed using measures such as
reproductive success (number of surviving offspring) or
indirect proxies of reproductive success such as food intake,
energy efficiency or mating frequency. Purported cases of
CCE in non-human species use such measures and proxies.
Macaques may improve potato washing techniques to acquire
more food or make food more digestible [16]. Pigeons may
improve their flight efficiency to minimize energy expendi-
ture during migration to nesting or feeding sites [18]. It is a
reasonable assumption that increased food intake and
energy efficiency translate into higher reproductive success
and hence inclusive fitness.
Some cases of human CCE can be understood similarly,
particularly in non-agricultural, non-market economies. For
example, the spear-thrower and bow-and-arrow are projectile
technologies that improve the rate of food acquisition for
their users and users’ families. In other cases, particularly
in agricultural or industrialized societies, inclusive fitness
benefits are harder to see. Does knowledge of quantum phy-
sics enhance the inclusive fitness of its bearers? Do
smartphones enhance the inclusive fitness of their users?
This links to broader debates within human behavioural ecol-
ogy over fitness maximization in societies that have
undergone the demographic transition to low fertility and
mortality [68,69]. Proxies like monetary or material wealth,
or social status, may be more appropriate measures for
human CCE, given evidence that people in post-transition
societies appear not to maximize fertility [69]. Knowledge
of quantum physics provides employment, a salary and
social status, without necessarily maximizing inclusive (gen-
etic) fitness or reproductive success. Given this disconnect
with inclusive fitness, it may be more appropriate to talk of
‘cultural fitness’, the degree to which a product of CCE maxi-
mizes indirect proxies such as wealth or social status. Gene–
culture coevolution models suggest specific cases when gen-
etic and cultural fitness might diverge [29,30], such as when
wealth or status as indicators of whom to copy exhibit ‘run-
away’ cultural selection [29] or when maladaptive practices
are more visible than more effective alternatives [70].
A separate issue to whether the products of CCE enhance
the fitness of their bearers relates to fitness benefits to innova-
tors versus copiers. This applies to humans and non-human
species. In a sense, CCE is a cooperative dilemma: innovators
produce knowledge at some cost, while others can copy them
at less cost. In principle, this informational collective action
problem suffers the same challenges as non-informational
collective action problems such as maintaining fishing
stocks: free-riders may exploit the knowledge of innovators
causing innovation to cease [71]. While social learning has
been modelled as a cooperative (producer–scrounger)
dilemma [72], this is seldom placed in a CCE context. Perhaps
our extended criteria can only emerge when this collective
action problem is solved via institutions such as patentsystems or patronage [73] that ensure benefits to innovators.
Alternatively, fitness benefits of CCE could accrue to groups
rather than individuals, if groups with superior CCE due to
group members freely sharing knowledge outcompete
groups of informational free-riders with inferior CCE [74].
Further work should specify the dynamics of CCE within a
multilevel selection framework and carefully delineate the
fitness benefits and costs of different components of CCE to
individuals and groups.
Finally, while our core criteria assume a single measure of
performance, our final two extended criteria involve multiple
measures and the creation of new measures. Perhaps another
reason for human ecological success is not CCE per se, but the
ability for CCE to modify fitness proxies, generating an open-
ended dynamic without being tied tightly to inclusive fitness.
Interestingly, Kaplan et al. [69] suggest that the failure of
people in post-demographic transition societies to maximize
inclusive fitness may result from CCE, due to the higher par-
ental investment needed for children to acquire, via formal
education, ever-accumulating cultural knowledge. Conse-
quently, the modification of fitness proxies characterized in
our extended criteria may be both a consequence of CCE
and a facilitator of further CCE.(c) What socio-cognitive capacities underlie cumulative
cultural evolution?
Ongoing empirical work has attempted to delineate the
socio-cognitive capacities that underlie CCE, such as imita-
tion, teaching or theory of mind [37,75,76], or demographic
conditions such as partially connected populations [39,56],
but no consensus has emerged. The evidence reviewed
above suggests that CCE can emerge in the absence of
‘higher’ cognitive capacities [18]. Our multiple criteria
suggest that it may be fruitless looking for a single cognitive
capacity, or even suite of cognitive capacities, that underlie
CCE, if CCE itself comprises multiple subcomponents. Differ-
ent socio-cognitive capacities may underlie our core criteria
and each extended criteria. Furthermore, it may be incorrect
to treat cognition as a static, exogenous, species-specific
factor that permits (or does not permit) CCE. The learned
content of CCE may itself enhance cognitive capacities—a
human example would be reading and writing, cultural
inventions which seem to increase intelligence [77]. This
may, in turn, facilitate further CCE, which further enhances
cognition, in an ongoing coevolutionary dynamic. Whether
this dynamic also applies to non-human species and the
nature of this coevolution (e.g. whether genetic changes are
involved) are worthy of further study.8. Conclusion
We have attempted to highlight the multiple senses in which
CCE is used in the literature. We have identified a set of core
criteria that seem essential for CCE: the introduction of
behavioural novelty or modification, the transmission of
behaviour via social learning, the improvement in genetic
and/or cultural fitness or fitness proxies as a result of the
learned behaviour and the repeated transmission and
improvement of the behaviour over time. These criteria are
central to the original formulation of CCE [2,3] and the
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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extended criteria—diversification, recombination, exaptation
and niche construction—that seem to be involved in many
of the paradigmatic cases of human CCE cited in the litera-
ture, but do not appear as yet to have been observed in
non-human species.
We suggest that treating CCE as unitary phenomenon,
and especially as a rubicon between human and non-
human species, is unhelpful. Researchers should be explicit
about which criteria they are testing. Although CCE is com-
monly cited as the key to human ecological success, we
suspect that only our extended criteria actually underlie
this success. As shown in electronic supplementary material,
table S3, our core criteria have been demonstrated in non-
human species that would not normally be attributed
human-like levels of ecological dominance. This does not
make such findings any less interesting, and indeed, linking
such phenomena to human success may unnecessarily
detract from their importance. Similarly, seeking a single
set of socio-cognitive capacities that underlie CCE maybenefit from specifying the precise CCE criteria being
tested, given that different cognitive capacities may underlie
different core and extended criteria, and different species
may achieve the same criteria with different cognitive mech-
anisms. Finally, we suspect that much will be gained by a
deeper consideration of the informational basis and conse-
quences of CCE processes, the fitness dynamics of CCE,
such as the modification and creation of cultural fitness
proxies, and the dynamics of CCE as a cooperative dilemma
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